National Security Lawyering: The Best View of the Law as a Regulative Ideal

In The National Security Lawyer in Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law May Not Be the Best View, Robert Bauer describes the challenges for executive branch lawyers providing advice during a national security crisis. Bauer focuses on two especially perilous episodes in United States history—the Cuban Missile Crisis and the run-up to U.S. involvement in World War II—and analyzes the legal advice Presidents Kennedy and Roosevelt, respectively, received. In both cases, widely respected lawyers gave legal advice that supported the President’s preferred outcome, but almost certainly did not represent what the lawyers considered the best view of the law. The “best view” model of lawyering appears to have no formal or widely recognized definition, either in Bauer’s article or elsewhere in the literature. Perhaps the best articulation of the concept is in the memorandum that sets out the “best practices” for the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which directs OLC lawyers to “provide advice based on [their] best understanding of what the law requires—not simply an advocate’s defense of the contemplated action or position proposed by an agency or the Administration.” In rendering this advice, they must seek “to provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that appraisal will constrain the Administration’s or an agency’s pursuit of desired practices or policy objectives.” Bauer takes a dim view of this best view model, which he considers rigid, disconnected from important policy context, and unworkable in a crisis. Bauer proposes an exception to the best view approach for lawyers facing a national security crisis. Lawyers under those circumstances, he argues, should be free to provide alternative legal analysis that supports the preferred policy position, so long as it is credible and made in good faith. Bauer’s proposal to create an exception to the best view standard for crises, however, risks compromising the quality of national security lawyering overall. National security lawyers in the Executive Branch practice in an environment without many of the formal and informal incentives for high-quality legal advice that are common in other fields. The stakes are unusually high, which increases pressure from policymakers. At the same time, there is less external oversight from the courts and Congress, and the secrecy of much of the subject matter makes peer and public input difficult. Because of these challenges, it is important to build into the process of developing national security legal advice as many protections for high-quality legal analysis as possible. The best view standard is such a protection, and a critical one. The best view standard is important to high-quality national security lawyering not because it always results in an objectively “right” legal answer—that is not possible. Instead, the best view standard acts as a guidepost—a regulative ideal— for lawyers, reminding them of their distinctive role in the process and grounding them with an external professional standard. It serves as a counterweight to the inevitable pressures that these lawyers face. It also honors and upholds the unique responsibilities of Executive Branch lawyers to assist the President in carrying out his constitutional responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Bauer’s proposal to recognize a lower standard in crisis situations would subvert this protection

General Counsel of the FBI, James Baker, in Conversation with Professor Mary DeRosa on the FBI and International Justice

Mary DeRosa, Georgetown Law Professor, former Deputy Counsel to President Obama for National Security Affairs, former Legal Advisor to the National Security Council under President Obama, and former Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council in the Clinton Administration, interviewed current General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), James Baker. The two discussed the FBI’s role in international law enforcement and the domestic tension between technological advancement and law enforcement duties

The President and Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, and Process

There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. In the Cold War, the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation necessitated procedures emphasizing speed and efficiency and placing sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands. In today’s changed threat environment, the legal authorities and process a U.S. president would confront when making this grave decision merit reexamination. This paper serves as a resource in the national discussion about a president’s legal authority and the procedures for ordering a nuclear strike, and whether to update them

Deliberative Constitutionalism in the National Security Setting

Deliberative democracy theory maintains that authentic deliberation about matters of public concern is an essential condition for the legitimacy of political decisions. Such deliberation has two features. The first is deliberative rigor. This is deliberation guided by public-regarding reasons in a process in which persons are genuinely open to the force of the better argument. The second is transparency. This requires that requires that officials publicly explain the reasons for their decisions in terms that citizens can endorse as acceptable grounds for acting in the name of the political community. Such requirements would seem to be especially important in the national security setting, where decisions can have profound life-and-death consequences. Yet this is the setting in which transparency often is least feasible on the part of the Executive branch. Officials may be constrained for good reasons from fully explaining the bases for their decisions. While such reason-giving is especially important to the perceived legitimacy of a decision, anticipating the need to provide it also can enhance deliberative rigor. Limited transparency thus creates the risk both that crucial decisions may not be regarded as legitimate, and that the deliberative process will not be as robust as it should be. In this chapter, we argue that ensuring robust internal deliberative processes in the national security setting can compensate at least to some degree for this limitation. Appreciating the demands of deliberative democracy theory can help inform this process by illuminating how various procedural mechanisms may promote the goals that transparency purports to serve. We focus on the Lawyers Group, which includes senior national security lawyers from across the government, as an example of an arrangement that can help further the ends of deliberative democracy by providing a vehicle for deliberation that meets many, even if not all, of the requirements of that theory. Coordinated by the legal advisor for the National Security Council, this group discusses national security issues that will be presented to the President. We regard our analysis as contributing in two ways to deliberative democratic theory. First, it focuses on the possibility of satisfying the requirement of this theory in a setting in which decision-making often falls short of the demands of full transparency. Second, it suggests how legal analysis may play a distinctive role in the deliberative process. There are limits to what the Lawyers Group can accomplish. We believe, however, that it should be assessed in terms of its contribution to the larger national security deliberative system of which it is a part. From this perspective, the Group’s compliance with several prescriptions of deliberative theory helps it strengthen, even if it does not guarantee, the rigor and persuasiveness of the justifications that the President is able to provide for national security decisions

Canagliflozin and renal outcomes in type 2 diabetes and nephropathy

BACKGROUND Type 2 diabetes mellitus is the leading cause of kidney failure worldwide, but few effective long-term treatments are available. In cardiovascular trials of inhibitors of sodium–glucose cotransporter 2 (SGLT2), exploratory results have suggested that such drugs may improve renal outcomes in patients with type 2 diabetes. METHODS In this double-blind, randomized trial, we assigned patients with type 2 diabetes and albuminuric chronic kidney disease to receive canagliflozin, an oral SGLT2 inhibitor, at a dose of 100 mg daily or placebo. All the patients had an estimated glomerular filtration rate (GFR) of 30 to <90 ml per minute per 1.73 m2 of body-surface area and albuminuria (ratio of albumin [mg] to creatinine [g], >300 to 5000) and were treated with renin–angiotensin system blockade. The primary outcome was a composite of end-stage kidney disease (dialysis, transplantation, or a sustained estimated GFR of <15 ml per minute per 1.73 m2), a doubling of the serum creatinine level, or death from renal or cardiovascular causes. Prespecified secondary outcomes were tested hierarchically. RESULTS The trial was stopped early after a planned interim analysis on the recommendation of the data and safety monitoring committee. At that time, 4401 patients had undergone randomization, with a median follow-up of 2.62 years. The relative risk of the primary outcome was 30% lower in the canagliflozin group than in the placebo group, with event rates of 43.2 and 61.2 per 1000 patient-years, respectively (hazard ratio, 0.70; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.59 to 0.82; P=0.00001). The relative risk of the renal-specific composite of end-stage kidney disease, a doubling of the creatinine level, or death from renal causes was lower by 34% (hazard ratio, 0.66; 95% CI, 0.53 to 0.81; P<0.001), and the relative risk of end-stage kidney disease was lower by 32% (hazard ratio, 0.68; 95% CI, 0.54 to 0.86; P=0.002). The canagliflozin group also had a lower risk of cardiovascular death, myocardial infarction, or stroke (hazard ratio, 0.80; 95% CI, 0.67 to 0.95; P=0.01) and hospitalization for heart failure (hazard ratio, 0.61; 95% CI, 0.47 to 0.80; P<0.001). There were no significant differences in rates of amputation or fracture. CONCLUSIONS In patients with type 2 diabetes and kidney disease, the risk of kidney failure and cardiovascular events was lower in the canagliflozin group than in the placebo group at a median follow-up of 2.62 years

General Counsel of the FBI, James Baker, in Conversation with Professor Mary DeRosa on the FBI and International Justice

Mary DeRosa, Georgetown Law Professor, former Deputy Counsel to President Obama for National Security Affairs, former Legal Advisor to the National Security Council under President Obama, and former Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council in the Clinton Administration, interviewed current General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), James Baker. The two discussed the FBI’s role in international law enforcement and the domestic tension between technological advancement and law enforcement duties